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ABSTRACT 
For some Localised Agro-Food Systems (LAFS) in Europe, the cheese and milk prices are above average whilst others 
are similar or even below average. The objective of this paper is to shed light on levers , which the agents activate to 
assure their uniqueness is irrevocable, and uphold the benefits of their LAFS. Raising Rivals' Costs Theory gives 
interesting point of view about the behaviour of firms, which could make use of the collective rules to raise the 
costs of their competitors in the particular case of LAFS oriented to the production of traditional cheeses. This will 
be explored through two cases studies.  
Keywords: PDO, localised agro-food system, Raising Rivals’ Costs, governance of LAFS  
 
 
1 Introduction 
With the Common Agricultural Policy’s (CAP) shift (abandonment of the m ilk quota system and 
redefinition of the CAP in Europe) the future of dairy production in Europe mountain regions raises 
numerous questions for private and public stakeholders. Dairy farmers in mountain regions tend to turn 
toward cheese production with distinctive product quality schemes based on localized agro-food systems 
(LAFS). 
The objective of this paper is to set up and discuss an analytical framework to explain the price 
differences while analyzing the regulatory mechanisms of the concerned LAFS. It  leads to the discussion 
on market power at the different levels of the supply chain (producers, processors, etc.) and on the way 
they organize themselves collectively for setting and controlling production requirements which impact 
price mechanisms. 
We will first present the analytical framework for the regulatory modes of the PDO supply chains based 
(2) and then expose the empirical results (3). We will then discuss the relevance of our analytical 
framework to explain the diversity of regulatory modes used in PDO cheese supply chains and their 
linkage with the price level at farm gate (4) before concluding (5).  
2  Analytical framework for the regulatory modes and methods 
2.1 Hypothesis 
With regard to PDO cheese supply chains, the collective regulation relies on the collective governance 
mode (territory or sectoral) based on (i) added value creation depends on the mechanisms set to efficient 
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collective governance and to indicate product differentiation (Barjolle, 2006); (ii) cost control as a lasting 
competitive advantage does not necessarily aim at reducing, but depends on the production r equirements 
and the collective organization’s ability to have them applied by all agents. The collective ruling and 
control of the code of practices can be understood as a strategy to raise competitor’s costs and therefore 
prevent them from imposing another production system mostly based on cost leadership (Porter, 1985); 
(iii) the distribution of value along the supply chain depends on the presence of an institutionalized 
guidance mechanism of upstream prices according to downstream product quality (Marty, Sylvander, 
2000). 
PDO supply chains exemplify LAFS as the production and processing must, by legal definition, take place in 
a specific territory. PDO is a property right recognized at European Union (EU) and World Trade 
Organization (WTO) levels, which allows the protection of geographical names under strict conditions, l ike 
a real link between certain specific qualities of a product or its reputation and its geographical origin.  
This analytical framework highlights the diversity of the states’ role when delegating its ruling power for 
economic affairs to collective organizations, which can control legal regulation mechanisms (for instance: 
contracts, code of practices, production planning and control). These initiatives show variable success 
with regard to milk production price. Some are considered as success stories (Protected Designation of 
Origin (PDO) Comté in France, PDO Gruyère in Switzerland, PDO Parmigiano Reggiano in Italy) (Perrier-
Cornet, 2009), others (for instance PDO Cantal) do not show benefit while showing some of the lowest 
prices for raw milk at farm gate (Barjolle, Réviron, Sylvander, 2007).  
While focusing on the collective strategies and coordination mechanisms, it will be explored how the 
regulation’s levers can influence and prevent the entry to rivals (new entrants) who would not apply the 
rules. The implementation of the collective strategy can explain the noticed gap in the milk price even 
though other factors intervene like the official recognition and therefore protection of the PDO name, 
consumers’ preference, consumption trends, the strength of competition and substitution products, etc. 
(Barjolle, Chappuis, Dufour, 2000).  
The production systems or organizations, in order to increase their competitive advantage, seek to control 
the creation of economic value, how this value gets distributed among the stakeholders. The cost level 
control helps to impose a certain level of costs to new entrants. However, the fair distribution of the 
economic value along the chain is linked to the market power repartition between the different firms.  
We propose to use two analytical grids to explain the differences of performance in the case of two 
supply chains: 
On one side, an analytical grid of the production system will include three key elements: the creation of 
added value, the distribution between the stakeholders along the value chain from agricultural production 
to the end product, and its protection with a cost control mechanism.  
On the other side, an analytical grid of the governance modes (sectoral vs. territorial) of the supply chain 
(Allaire, Sylvander, 1997) ; (Marty, Sylvander, 2000). It sheds light on the relations between the 
stakeholders, in particular on the delegation of power to an institutionalized and administrated authority 
(supply chain organization, product organization) that plays an essential role for the collective 
management of the product 
2.2 First analytical grid: production system and its regulation 
The grid explores each organization and its related PDO supply chain in three different dimensions: (1) 
creating value; (2) distributing value (remuneration of the production factors); (3) setting-up of a lasting 
competitive advantage 
2.2.1  Creating value 
The first dimension is about value creation within the supply chain. Two elements play a role on the level 
of creating value. 
The first element involves the stakeholders’ capacity to take advantage of the specific resources on their 
territory to feed into the differentiation strategy (Mollard, 2001). We refer to local know-how which 
creates product’s uniqueness linked to origin (cattle feed, local practices, seasonal dimension, etc.). To 
acknowledge specificity, the practices will be officially registered in the PDO protocols and will be 
communicated in the media campaign of product promotion (individual or collective).  
The second element is about production control and monitoring (Marty & Sylvander, 2000). Indeed, the 
supply system should not go through over or underproduction periods in order to balance supply with 
demand, restrain price volatility, and optimize the quality and sales of the product. In theory, there are 
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multiple ways for managing cheese supply. It may include (non-exhaustive list): the quota system 
(allocation of annual rights to produce cheese); the control of market opening (campaign planning); the 
control of the territory where production takes place including the reduction of the zone; the financing of 
redirecting milk overproduction to standardized markets; as well as the implementation of export support 
measures. Quality management through cheese selection and downgrading is an effective tool when the 
cheese reprocessing industry can take advantage of the downgraded quantities  
2.2.2 Distributing value 
The distribution of added value through the different levels of the supply chain is the second factor, which 
have been identified thank previous research (Barjolle &al., 2007). Outsourcing indeed affects the 
remuneration of production factors. The extent of the distribution of the value between the levels of the 
supply chain can be measured by analyzing milk and cheese price settings. In theory, the bilateral price 
setting mechanism between stakeholders can be institutionally guided by the PDO supply chain 
organization.  
Several options can be considered. Price policy sets the terms for bilateral transactions. For instance, 
upstream price setting can be based on the real cheese value obtained on the market. Price calculation 
may result out of market data, which are made publicly available (cheese price depending on quality and 
weighed by volume). This mechanism might be formalized with a standard contract approved by the 
stakeholders of the supply chain. In other instances, the milk price at farm gate may be set without 
relation to the selling price of cheese originating from each individual delivery point. Price negotiation 
may then refer to more general data on national or European market prices for dairies (CNIEL grid in 
France). Negotiation may as well happen through mutual agreement based on market leader’s price level, 
rather than considering the real performance of the milk buying company. Further measures (quality 
based price following a grid set up by the supply chain inter-professional organization, equalization fund, 
and direct payment) can be put in place to support the price setting mechanism 
2.2.3 Setting-up of a lasting competitive advantage 
The analytical framework refers to the domain of “Laws and Economics”, based on the observ ation of “law 
in action” using direct legal sources. This discipline aims at analyzing and understanding the economic 
consequences of operating legal mechanisms (Kirat, 2005). The legal elements form the relevant 
dimensions for the stakeholders for setting and implementing an economical strategy while seeking to 
influence their institutional environment and the relations between the economic stakeholders.  
As do many other economic sectors, the European milk and dairy sectors are marked by the rising power 
of big industrial groups creating a situation of quasi-oligopoly. Their position is mostly based on large 
economies of scale. These economies of scale also depend on the way the value chain is organized, 
allowing to reach low cost levels while reaching broadening markets. The value chain refers to the whole 
group of products and producers contributing to the market supply.  
According to Porter (1986), the value chain analysis allows to find the contribution of each activity to 
obtain a competitive advantage. In order to lower their costs, big industrial groups continuously arbitrate 
between in-house production and outsourcing, as well as spatial integration or splitting.  
The implementation of these strategies constitutes massive competition attacks that result in eliminating 
competitors that do not succeed in developing alternative strategies. Large industrial dairy groups mostly 
set up their processing plants within the major milk producing regions. Some companies remotely guide 
their whole supply chain while seeking a competitive advantage through cost leadership strategy. Vertical 
integration of suppliers (and horizontal integration of competitors) is a result of large groups’ strategy for 
reducing production costs (Morvan, 1991). By this mean, economies of scale are achieved as fix costs get 
distributed on bigger production batch.  
Following the line of Coase (1937), Williamson (1985) developed the idea that vertical integration 
depends on the potential achievement of economies of information resulting from the integration of 
economic relations. According to his theoretical framework, companies tend to integrate their suppliers 
based on their asset’s specificities and the transactions’ frequency (contract’s specificity), in other words, 
on the potential reduction of transaction cost that companies can expect.  
The seeking for market power can be founded on a strategy of raising competitors’ costs without 
necessarily cutting one’s own production costs.  
The Raising Rivals’ Costs theory (Salop, Scheffman, 1983; Scheffman, Higgins, 2003) analyses the behavior 
of searching market power. It states that suppliers’ integration or exclusive contracting with suppliers 
enables the specific stakeholder to impose, at supply level, higher costs to competitors while weakening 
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their position. The “predatory” company seeks to take control of suppliers that are indispensable for the 
competitors, and induce higher prices for the intermediary goods or services compared to the cost the 
company bear. Competitors face an induced market power and see their profits being reduced by the cost 
increase and the pressure put by the predatory firm on the selling price of the end products. Fo cusing on 
the factors leading to vertical integration, this approach reverses the analysis as it suggests that suppliers’ 
integration does not allow lowering the production and/or transaction costs but instead imposing higher 
costs to weaken competition while integrating or taking control of their suppliers 
2.3 Second analytical grid: governance 
Promoting an original way to manage businesses, the governance of the supply chain (in this case PDO 
supply chains) results from the capacity of the different agents (Baron, 2003) (who have decision power) 
to collectively set the goals, the means and the actions’ rules. In order to highlight the heterogeneity of 
the PDO supply chains with regard to their linkage to the territory, some authors (Allaire, Sylvander, 1997; 
Marty, Sylvander, 2000) draw the distinction between territorial and sectoral governance. We propose an 
analytical grid inspired by this analysis of territorial versus sectoral governance and crossed with our grid 
of the regulation of cheese production systems. 
Sectoral governance is understood as business management by a group of firms defending their interests 
in the name of their sector. Over time, these companies mostly merge with their competitors over time. 
As a result, the power relations between the economic agents of the sector mainly consist in negotiations 
between dairy farmers and the industrial level in the framework of an authority that is, in France, 
supported by the government. 
Territorial governance by managing organization is a business management mode for collective matters 
that can be set off by the state. This organization mode can take the form of a supply chain inter -
professional organization. Whereas in the territorial governance, the organization’s mission is to 
represent and to defend the production system’s interests (the products and its agents). The supply chain 
organization enables the agents to coordinate the regulations and the actions between them and which 
will take the form of inter-professional agreements containing the code of practices, the collective 
marketing of the products, the definition of the production zone, and the setting of the dues for the 
organization. The organization relies on this policy for acting. The power relations between the stages are 
set up within the organization creating an institutionalized place for consultation.  
2.4 Data sets of our 2 case studies 
To discuss this framework, two different PDO cheese supply chain strategies were studied (Cantal in 
France and Gruyère in Switzerland) at the different stages (dairy farmers, cheese-makers, and cheese-
ripeners) using three major sources: (i) One source for characterizing the dynamic of each  cheese supply 
chain over a long period of time. The characteristics and the evolution of the productive structures at the 
different stages were analyzed in order to recreate the agents’ paths. To obtain the data, we conducted a 
survey among the stakeholders and also used documentary sources (Meyer, 2009); (ii) One source for 
characterizing the protection strategy of the production systems based on the analysis of the legal 
documents of each PDO. These documents sets the content of the PDO’s codes of practices and t hrow 
light on the production’s organization and the constraints put on competitors  ; (iii) One source for 
analyzing the value creation and the mechanism for its distribution among the different stages of the 
supply chain. We have identified the specific resources used, the productive structures of the supply 
chains (technical and social division of labor between stakeholders), the mechanisms for managing supply, 
as well as the fundamental inter-professional agreements that set the payment modalities for cheese. 
3 PDO Cantal and Swiss Gruyère: two different strategies for protecting production 
systems based on tradition and terroir 
The discussion of the analytical framework aiming at explaining the milk price differences is made in 
comparing two contrasted contexts (PDO Cantal and PDO Swiss Gruyère). For each supply chain, we 
present the productive and structural characteristics and the governance mode, so that to come up with 
explanations for a higher (or lower) price level compared to substitute products  
3.1 The Cantal supply chain: a French PDO cheese supply chain dominated by industrial cheese-makers 
3.1.1 An industrial cheese supply chain 
Agriculture in the mountains of the centre of France is strongly dedicated to milk production that feeds 
into cheese supply chains benefiting from a legal recognition through an official quality label (several 
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PDOs: Cantal, Saint-Nectaire, Bleu d’Auvergne, Fourme d’Ambert, Salers). These products originate from 
the Auvergne Region, grouping, in 2007, around 8’000 dairy farmers producing more than 1’200 millions 
litres of milk. Among them, 2’800 farmers produce milk necessary for 17’800 tons of PDO Cantal. Since 
1990, the  PDO Cantal production is stabilized around 18’000 tons . 
From a historical perspective, the PDO Cantal was the most important vector to the organizational 
development of the cheese supply chain in the Cantal department, based at the beginning on a specific 
technical and social division of labor before a modernization turn during which some industrial cheese -
making units have taken control over the supply chain. As a result, they have drastically gained in market 
power, having reached the quasi-exclusive access to market. Today, two industrial processors control 
around 70% of the PDO Cantal production. Finally, industrial cheese-makers impose a changed production 
system mostly based on cost leadership strategy to increase their competitive advantage. As a 
consequence, the dairy farmers have lost their negotiation power toward their buyers.  
3.1.2 A powerful industry as channel captain 
Three steps mark the construction process for obtaining the protected denomination of origin.  
The initial first step aimed at obtaining the territorial exclusivity for the product. The Cantal indeed 
benefits from a PDO’s protection with a ruling of the Magistrates’ Court of Saint-Flour in 1956.  
The second step consisted in collectively setting the production standards defining the production system. 
Large industrial dairy groups mostly set up their processing plants within the Cant al department. Under 
the influence of industrial dairy processors, the agents together fixed the requirements for the dairy 
farmers of the land zone who were included in the initial PDO zone. The code of practices successively 
evolved towards fewer requirements to promote intensive agriculture practices based on corn silage feed 
for the Prim’Holstein breed, leading toward to exclude linkage to the terroir. Farmers became standard 
dairy suppliers and had the same price of their non-specific milk as French standard milk. At the same 
time, all the rulings of the code of practices focused on promoting large-scale dairy units (heating 
treatment for the milk and robot for the processing activities were allowed). Therefore, it forced small 
dairy processors involved in the supply chain to reduce their costs at dairy stage by increasing the 
production, and numerous of them couldn’t accept and disappeared. Large industrial dairy groups realized 
vertical integration of suppliers (and horizontal integration of competitors) to impose a production system 
mostly based on cost leadership strategy. 
The third step for dairy farmers face an induced industrial and market power, and see their milk prices 
being continually low consisted to change the conditions of production. Since 2007, thank a new code of 
practices, the dairy farmers are able to highlight again their contribution to the product quality and 
specific link to the geographical origin. The implementation of the code of practices (GMOs’ prohibition, 
land load limitation ratio of one hectare fodder per milking cow, cows’ grazing mandatory) impacts the 
production costs and excludes from the production system the milk producers adopting intensive 
agricultural practices. 
The barriers to entry, which are raised by the code of practices for milk processing are protecting the 
specificity and link to the terroir founding the competitive advantage of the product. The creation of 
values is not effective because the cheese-makers don’t agree on the crucial elements determining quality 
differentiation, identity, image and long-term reputation at the consumers’ level. This value results also of 
the capacity to control the volume of production to avoid cheese shortage, overproduction and price 
volatility.  
3.1.3 A mechanism for distributing surplus adapted from a the national standard grid 
Both price for milk and grid to pay milk according to its quality are negotiated between farmers, cheese -
makers, within the national dairy inter-professional organization (CNIEL). The CNIEL provides 
recommendations, which are mostly followed by the agents of the supply chain with adaptation according 
the regional context. The original aspect lays in the establishment of the recommended price for cheese.  
The final value of the final product (cheeses, milk powder, butter...) is used as a reference for calculating 
the milk price. In Cantal region, milk price and quality grid are set for the whole region whatever industry 
or product was concerned.  
This regional price is disconnected to the PDO Cantal cheese market price, because the farmers in the 
supply chain do not know in which product is processed their milk. The milk price depends as well on the 
negotiation skills of the dairy farmers when discussing with the cheese-makers. Due to the fact that milk 
producers are just suppliers, their negotiation abilities are restricted. Moreover, the cheese -makers 
mustn’t declare their sales’ volumes and selling prices for cheese to the inter -professional organization. 
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The organization doesn’t publish reference prices of Cantal cheese, which could help market 
transparency.  
Consequently, over the last 15 years (excepted 2007) the milk price for PDO Cantal is the same as 
standard milk and reaches a 20% lower price compared to some French PDO (PDO Comté or PDO 
Morbier).  
3.2 The Swiss Gruyère PDO: a common differentiation strategy between milk producers, cheese-makers 
and cheese-ripeners 
3.2.1 A growing industry 
With a tonnage of 28’206 tons in 2008, the Gruyère amounts for 16 % of the Swiss cheese production and 
41% of the Swiss PDO volume. In the 1990’s, the Gruyère production was around 24'000 tons and reached 
over 29'000 tons in 2009, almost taking over the production of Emmental in the decrease since 1990 
(going from 56’600 tons to 30’000 tons in 2009). About 2’800 dairy farmers produce 340 millions liters 
milk yearly processed in 180 cheese-making facilities and 52 alps (grazing season). The production of 
29’000 tons of Swiss Gruyère (including 800 tons of organic cheese and 490 tons of Alp cheese) are sold to 
9 cheese ripeners who manage the sales outside the supply chain. In 2009, 40% of the Gruyère volume 
was exported and 7% went to the reprocessing industry (non-PDO cheese). The Swiss Gruyère supply 
chain is based on a great number of dairy farmers, small-scale cheese-making entities and a few cheese 
ripeners. The cheese-makers control the processing and only marginally sell cheese onsite for local 
customers.  
According to the inter-professional organization, the ripeners ensure a better market access and higher 
value for the cheese as they hold high volumes which give them a better position for negotiating. 
However, the role of the cheese-makers remains crucial as the cheese wheels mature for three and half 
months in the cheese-maker’s cellars, inducing additional costs at cheese-making level (the minimal 
duration of maturation is five months). The ripeners have exclusivity for the market access and do not 
interfere in the cheese production. The surplus resulting from the PDO collective organization is based on 
the negotiation of production and trade conditions for milk and fresh cheese while setting stringent 
traditional technical requirements in the terms of reference. Number and distribution of the cheese -
makers within the zone generate a great cheese diversity through the sourcing (plain or mountain) and 
the ripening duration. This diversity is comparable to the Cantal area.  
3.2.2 From a public to private governance modalities 
In the beginning of the 90’s, the Swiss Federal Department of Public Economy started a con sultation 
procedure for a new agriculture bill suppressing price guarantee for milk, opening borders to some 
cheeses import and reducing subsidies for agriculture goods exported to the European Union to enforce 
the GATT agreements signed in 1994. The federal legislation then opened new opportunities for the agro-
food sector in defining collective organization to which stakeholders could freely adhere.  
Agents active in specific product supply chains gathered and developed inter -professional organizations 
while completing the horizontal structures (producers’ organization, dairy association, cheese -wholesalers 
and exporters’ association). New forms of solidarity arose on the base of specific products link to their 
terroir. The regulation on inter-professional organizations leads the Swiss Confederation to enforce 
quality promotion and product marketing measures as well as supply management mechanisms based on 
market demand. Strict conditions were defined as to which organization was entitled to receive a 
mandatory power for enforcing its decisions (Boisseaux, Barjolle, 2004). 
At the same time, the Swiss Gruyère supply chain was facing the potential development of industrial 
dairies. In the 1990s, a firm together with several cheese-makers, planed to set up an industrial Swiss 
Gruyère production facility (milk collection every second day, shortened ripening duration, large volumes, 
technical changes at several steps in the production process) . Severe challenges in marketing the Swiss 
Emmental cheese indeed led some Emmental cheese-makers to plan to switch production for Gruyère. 
These attempts were threatening the authentic character of the Swiss Gruyère and the supply chain 
welfare in the cantons where production was historically founded. Still in the 90’s, the Gruyère production 
originated for 95% from the cantons Vaud, Fribourg, Jura, Berne, Jura and Neuchâtel. Several stakeholders 
started a recognition process for the future PDO Gruyère and took steps to defend the local and 
traditional practices and to counter the development of the production outside the traditional zone.  
These circumstances led, in the 90’s, the stakeholders to structure their approach successively through a 
Charter, an Inter-professional Body, and finally to a code of practices for the PDO. Led by the Swiss 
Gruyère supply chain, the creation of the Charter followed by the PDO protection set the ground to 
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maintain a traditional production within a context of industrialization and State disengagement. Finally, 
the Swiss Gruyère was recognized as Protected Designation of Origin in 2001 and registered in the 
Geographical Indications’ Register of the Federal Office of Agriculture.  
The conditions of production and processing were more detailed, based on main technical features 
determining the quality of the final cheese and especially its ability to maturation and long -term storage. 
Feeding silage was banned (hay as a main feed for cold periods) and the milk could not be treate d (except 
cooling). Milk processing should take place in copper tank within 18 hours after the last milking. The 
cheese-maker had to use rennet with home-grown milk bacteria and could not reincorporate whey cream. 
The ripening process had to last minimum 5 months before sales. Only the first and second milking can be 
mixed together for processing Gruyère. Milk tanks should be open and made out of copper with a 
maximal content of 6’600 liters and can be used for another cheese type production after washing. 
Besides, the distance between the cheese-making facility and the dairy farmer has to be smaller as a ray 
of 20 km, and milk has to be delivered twice a day after milking.  
The code of practices implicitly limits the size of the processing units and the str uctures on the zone. Any 
new entrant could anymore develop a strategy based on cost leadership through rationalization of the 
production process, production volume expansion, shortening of the ripening duration, production 
facilities’ expansion, or relocation of the activities.  
The Swiss Gruyère production follows a decentralized model maintaining an important economic activity 
through the 232 cheese-makers in the plain and the Alps included in the PDO zone. The code of practices 
defines a high quality product, which refers to small to medium sized cheese factories. Larger industrial 
groups that might be interested in entering the Gruyère production and market have to cope with all the 
quality standards and techniques, and cannot propose the product respect ing the rules for a much lower 
price, taking advantages of lower labor costs thank delocalization, or lower process costs thank drastic 
economies of scales. 
3.2.3 A mechanism of value distribution from upstream to downstream 
Since a small decade, the price gap between milk meant for PDO Swiss Gruyère and milk meant for 
instance for Swiss Emmental production is about 20 %. Though the State supports specifically all the 
producers delivering milk for non-pasteurized cheese production with a subsidy of 0.15 CHF/liter and the 
price gap can be traced back in the surplus. The other Swiss cheese supply chains, even the other Swiss 
PDO, do not achieve in paying such a high price for milk like the Swiss Gruyère. The reason is to be found 
in the specific shaping and organization of this supply chain. The inter-professional Swiss Gruyère 
organization plays an important role for creation of surplus as it hosted the negotiations resulting in 
setting quality criteria and using diverse management tools. 
Nowadays, the price for milk and cheese as well as the quality grid are negotiated between farmers, 
cheese-makers, and cheese-ripeners within the inter-professional Swiss Gruyère organization. These 
recommendations are mostly followed by the agents of the supply chain.  
The original aspect lays in the establishment of the recommended price. The final value of the final 
product is not used as a reference for calculating the milk price. Instead of it, the agents set a target milk 
price to which a margin for the cheese-makers is added, resulting in a price for the Swiss Gruyère on the 
market. Of course, this price is not disconnected to the market price and it is obvious that the consumers 
are willing to pay that price since the sells still increase at that level of prices *. This process is facilitated 
on the Swiss market by the duopolistic organization of the retail industry, also involved in the supply chain 
and, more generally, promoting products made in Switzerland. 
Dairy farmers could maintain a balance in the power they have in the Swiss case contrary to the French 
case. The power relation allows weighing on the value distribution between the agents. On one side it 
brings transparency on the product’s price at market stage and supply management mechanisms 
negotiated within the supply chain’s organization. On the other side, when the value of the final product 
is communicated, the power relation between the agents is rebalanced through the distribution of the 
producers’ surplus among the agents. A recommended price for the cheese or for the milk is collectively 
set and its implementation goes through a contract standard adopted by most of the agents.  
                                                 
* The milk price comprises a basis price (around 0.50 CHF per litre) to which incentive subsidies meant to guide production 
are added (PDO Gruyère milk bonus: 0.10 CHF/litre, quality bonus: 0.05 CHF/litre). Moreover, two subsidies depend on the 
agricultural policy: the bonus for the milk dedicated to cheese-production (0.15 CHF/litre) and the no-silage feed bonus 
(0.03 CHF/litre). 
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4 Discussion 
Cheese markets governance models Cantal and Gruyère are quite different. They both focus on a product 
whose name is protected, and rely on agents sharing collective interests and structured in an inter -
professional organization. These are interesting examples of collective action deploying a strategy of 
competitive advantage based on origin. Cantal focus on cost leadership strategy while Swiss Gruyère 
focuses on product differentiation and specific quality linked to origin. They exemplify what sectoral 
(Cantal) and territorial (Swiss Gruyère) governance can be.  
 
The analysis of these PDO supply chains allows us to highlight that pricing mechanism depends on three 
major factors that give ground to our analytical grid for the regulation of production systems (cf. table 1):  
This first factor is linked with the ability of the supply chain of a localized agro -food supply chain to set up 
a collective level of governance. Along the value building process, the collective organization decides the 
use of specific territorial resources and takes control over the quality (quality segmentation, grading, and 
clearing of low quality cheese towards the reprocessing industry). 
The second factor refers to the legal framework and its implementation. The setting-up and enforcement 
of strict production rules empower the collective structure, and allow structuring the relations between 
dairy farmers, cheese-makers and ripeners. However, the public recognition and institutional protection 
of the geographical indication does not guarantee higher milk prices for the farmers (Barjolle et al., 2007; 
Meyer, 2009).  
The third factor is linked with the dynamic of the market power between the firms within the supply chain 
along the time. The distribution of the value added along the supply chain  changes over the time 
according to the market structure.  
The conjunction of these three factors explains the price gap between the model based on the 
differentiation linked to the geographical origin and specificity (Swiss Gruyere case), and the industri al 
model where the production is controlled by few large dairies (Cantal case).  
We draw as conclusion that a collective organization, with its capacity to master supply with a large range 
of different tools can be considered in the Swiss case as an institution giving the capacity to the supply 
chain to deliver and to distribute economic value in a fair manner between the agents while maintaining 
and protecting the collective organization over time. It allows the production to increase constantly with 
the time, as the adjustment between demand and supply are well manage at collective level, like a unique 
firm could manage a product sold under an unique brand. Nevertheless, as illustrated by the case of the 
Cantal cheese, this functioning can evaluate with the market dynamic: with the time, market power raised 
by few firms can allow them to take control on the collective organization and can reduce its ability to 
manage quality and supply. It’s not because these two firms in PDO Cantal are not interested in qua lity 
but certainly because they achieve their competitive advantage through cost leadership strategy and less 
through differentiation strategy. 
As a conclusion of this research as well of previous ones, we are the opinion that this is mostly the case 
when the companies have grown by vertical integration of suppliers and horizontal integration of 
competitors. Economies of scale can be achieved as fix costs get distributed on bigger production batch. It 
is a result of large groups’ strategy for reducing production costs. If a company wants to achieve a cost 
leadership strategy, she has to grow to compensate the loss of the margin for one product by a lower 
benefit on more products. It’s not the only strategy she develops, but if she has succeeded and has 
reached a certain level of market power, her advantage is to reduce the cost of all inputs, including milk. 
Therefore, it is the best solution for her to ask milk producers and the cheese makers to lower their own 
costs. In other case, obviously, and generally if the big firms cannot control the supply chain, they choose 
more easily to develop their competitive advantage through a differenciation strategy, using the quality 
policies. But, at the same time, it’s costly to develop a differentiation strategy while the company has 
already invested to reduce its costs to achieve the competitive advantage through cost leadership 
strategy. 
We are though very much aware of the limits of our approach as the hypothesis was only tested on some 
PDOs and it cannot be generalized. Further research is presently conducted to test this analytical grid of 
the regulation modes of localized production systems in order to discuss the validity of our preliminary 
conclusions. 
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Regarding the use of RCC theory, the main points of discussion are the followin g. 
The specific rules in the codes of practices set restrictions so to give decisive advantages to small -scale 
enterprises thank the imposition to their competitors (large dairy industry companies and intensive dairy 
farmers) specific production techniques and its related costs. This constitutes a lever for imposing to the 
certain economic agents a certain level of production costs which corresponds to a certain type of 
producers/processors.  
RCC theory helps to answer the question whether the PDO cheese production costs are actually imposed 
to competitors by the defenders of the local PDO production system.  
Indeed, the PDO-regulation allows new entrants, while they respect the code of practices. Therefore, the 
quality requirements are determined at long term by the willingness of the consumers to pay more for a 
certain level of quality, because the pressure of the demand pushes the quantities forward continuously.  
Within this framework, firms can play an active role while using their influence toward the in stitutional 
environment and the organization of the relations between agents. However, the question is whether this 
influence increases the producers’ welfare against the consumers’ welfare.  
The two cases studies allow drawing the conclusion that a case-by-case analysis is necessary. The 
assessment could be made observing if the following conditions are met:  
First condition is that the production costs are permanently challenged by new entrants respecting the 
common rules. 
Second condition is that the production costs correspond to quality requirements which really meet the 
consumers’ expectations, not only in terms of quality of the final product but also in terms of methods of 
production which may rely to hand-made process and traditional knowledge. 
Third condition is that the governance among the firm within the collective governance structure respects 
the interests of each group of firms in a well-balanced manner. 
 
Table 1. 
Comparison of the regulations of the PDO Swiss Gruyère and the PDO Cantal 
 Sectoral Governance 
PDO Cantal 
Territorial Governance 
PDO Swiss Gruyère 
Value 
Creation 
 
Differentiation based on technology 
Internal supply control by each individual 
company (on several products and several 
locations) 
Common supply control (storage, 
intervention) 
Take advantage of specific local resources 
Supply control through managing scarcity : 
definition of the production zone, quota system, 
exclusion of low quality cheese and segmentation 
by quality grading  
Value 
Distribution 
Negotiation through mutual agreements 
between producers and the industry 
National price grid 
No relation between the selling price of the 
end product and the milk payment 
Institutional mechanism for setting price based 
on quality 
Standard contract  
Price transparency (monitoring, cheese 
exchange) 
 
Preservation 
of the 
competitive 
advantage  
Cost leadership strategy 
Individual branding strategy 
Vertical integration of suppliers 
Horizontal integration of competitors  
Geographical disintegration 
Differentiation strategy based on product-terroir 
linkage 
Barriers of entry for competitors by controlling 
the code of practices 
Impose costs to competitors (raising rivals’ costs 
strategy) 
Regulation of 
the 
production 
system 
Production system is controlled by market 
leaders (oligopoly) 
 
Power relation set up within an organization 
dedicated to managing and protecting the 
product 
The state gives power of attorney to the 
organization. 
   
Dominique Barjolle and Jeanneaux Philippe / Int. J. Food System Dynamics 3 (1), 2012, 11-21 
 
20 
5 Conclusion 
In this article we propose to test with two polar cases (PDO Cantal vs. PDO Gruyère) the relevance of an 
analytical framework for the regulatory modes and methods which mobilizes two analytical grids to 
explain the differences of performance. The first analytical grid of the production system includes three 
key elements: the creation of added value, the distribution between the stakeholders along the value 
chain from agricultural production to the end product, and its protection with a cost control mechanism. 
The second is an analytical grid of the governance modes (sectoral vs. territorial) of the supply chain. It 
sheds light on the power relations between the stakeholders which play an essential role for the collective 
management of supply chain. 
Different performances in PDO cheese supply chains can be observed with regard to milk price at farm 
gate. The two case studies show a price difference around 25% depending years between the PDO 
products and industrial products.  
The analysis of two contrasted cases studies allows identifying the main factors of explanations for the 
pricing mechanisms: the first factor is the ability of the supply chain to set up of a collective structure of 
management of the product; the second factor is the legal framework which empower the collective 
organization; the third factor is the dynamic of the market power between the firms within the supply 
chain along the time. 
RCC theory gives interesting point of view about the behavior of firms which could make use of the 
collective rules to raise the costs of their competitors. The raising of costs is obvio us in both case studies 
but contrasted conclusions can be drawn case.  
In the case of territorial collective governance mode (Swiss Gruyere case), the conditions are met to 
conclude that this strategy of raising costs corresponds to requirements which are based to a 
corresponding quality which meets consumers’ expectations and willingness to pay. Conditions of 
production correspond to higher prices of production, milk producers and cheese makers are paid 
according to their costs of production. In the case of sectoral governance mode (Cantal case), few firms 
have taken control on the supply chain and have imposed with the time a model based on costs’ 
leadership. Quality refers not to a strong link to the geographical origin and no collective management of 
quality takes place. Milk producers and cheese makers have no negotiation power and cannot argue 
refereeing to high quality requirements.  
As general conclusion, a case-by-case in-depth analysis should be made to assess whether strategy to 
raise costs of the rivals damages consumers welfare in the case of PDO supply chains.  
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